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Chemerinsky: Prosecutorial Immunity

PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Enin Chemerinksy*
Honorable George C. Pratt.
It is time to move ahead.
immunity.

Our next subject is prosecutorial

ProfessorErwin Chemerinsky:
My task is to discuss prosecutorial immunity.' In order to discuss
this, it has to be put in the broader context of absolute immunities.'
I am going to focus my remarks on three questions discussing
absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The first question is, what are the general principles of absolute
immunity that also apply to prosecutors? Second, when can
prosecutors claim absolute immunity as opposed to just receiving
qualified immunity? And third, from a practical perspective, how
is the distinction between absolute and qualified immunity for
prosecutors applied?
There are few important general principles of prosecutorial
immunity that I can identify. First, it's important to remember that
absolute immunity applies to the task, not to the office. Judges
have absolute immunity for their judicial acts, but not for their
administrative acts.
Legislators have absolute immunity for
legislative action, but they only have qualified immunity for their
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of
Southern California Law School.
This article is based on a transcript of remarks given at the Practicing Law
Institute's 14th Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Program,
November 1998.
' Erwin Chemerinsky, 14" Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, Vol.
2, 14 PRATrICING LAw INsT. 753, 765 (1998).
' Id. at 761. While the Supreme Court has held that individuals performing
certain functions have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983, the
Court explains that "[t]he presumption is that qualified rather than absolute
immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their
duties." Id. (quoting Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487 (1991)).
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administrative acts. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for
prosecutorial acts, but not for investigative, and not for
administrative acts.
There are several implications from this basic statement that
absolute immunity altaches to the task and not to the office. One
implication is that others who perform the task can also claim the
immunity. So, for example, lower courts are increasingly finding
that those besides judges who are performing judicial tasks are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity. For example, O'Neill v.
Mississippi Licensing Board says that because a state licensing
board for nurses is really performing an adjudicatory task,
especially in considering license revocation, that board receives
absolute judicial immunity.' Collyer v. Darling,6 another lower
court case, stated that where a personnel board is adjudicating, that
board is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 7 The notion is that
since the immunity goes to the task, it does not matter who the
individual is performing it.
The same is true with regard to prosecutors. For example, there
are a number of cases that say when social workers am functioning
essentially as prosecutors, they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity. Ernst v. Children and Family Services,8 and Thompson
v. SCAN Volunteers,9 both were instances where courts said that
since the social workers were functioning as prosecutors, the task
was prosecutorial in nature, and they are entitled to absolute
immunity. There are some cases that go the other way regarding

3 113 F.3d 62 (5th Cir. 1997).
5 Id. at 64. This case involved a § 1983 action brought by nurses against a

State Board of Nursing, its executive director, and board members for
violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by Board's revoking
nurses' licenses to practice nursing. Id.
698 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1996).
7 Id. at 218-19. A state employee brought claims for violation of procedural
due process under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) against various defendants,
including members of the State Personnel Board of Review, in either their
individual or both their official and individual capacities.
8 108 F.3d 486 (3rd Cir. 1997).
9 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996).
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social workers, allowing only qualified immunity, and I have listed
them as well. "o

Marty Schwartz this morning pointed out to me a recent decision
of the Fourth Circuit that follows this in another context. The case
is Jean v. Collins," where the question was the liability of police
officers for not turning exculpatory material over to a defendant.
The Fourth Circuit (en bane) said that police officers have absolute
immunity for failure to turn exculpatory material over to a criminal
defendant, because police in this capacity are performing a
prosecutorial task and are therefore entitled to absolute immunity. 2
Jean v. Collins also addressed the issue of the liability of the
police for not turning exculpatory material over to the prosecutor. t1
There, the Fourth Circuit said it was qualified immunity, and that
because it was not clearly established law the police were not to be
held liable.' 4 But I use the case as another illustration of how courts

say that when somebody is performing the task, they are entitled to
the immunity.
The other implication of this to which I have already alluded to, is
then prosecutors are performing non-prosecutorial tasks, they are
only entitled to qualified immunity. If the immunity goes to the
task and not to the office, then that explains why the prosecutor
who is in a non-prosecutorial role just gets good faith immunity,
where the judge in the non-judicial role gets good faith immunity,
and that application carries across the board.
The second general principle that is important here, is that often
the availability of absolute immunity depends on the relief sought.
This is certainly true with regard to prosecutors. Prosecutors have
absolute immunity as to claims for money damages, but prosecutors
have no immunity as to claims for injunctive relief. Indeed Ex
" See supra note 1 at 756 (citing White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731 (4th Cir.
1997)); Defore v. Premore, 86 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1996).
" 155 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 USLW 3409

(U.S. Dec. 16, 1998) (No. 98-980), reh'g en banc, 107 F.3d 1111 (4th Cir.
1997).
1 Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998).
3

Id. at 707.

14ld. at 708.
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parte Young' long ago held that prosecutors can be sued for
injunctive relief. One of the key ways around the Eleventh
Amendment is to sue the attorney general in federal court for
injunctive relief. To give prosecutors absolute immunity here would
create an enornious obstacleto applying federal law in the states.
Legislators, in contrast, have always been thought to have both
immunity from suits from money damages and from suits for
injunctive relief."' For judges the story is even more complicated.
In Pulliam v. Allen,' the United States Supreme Court said that
judges have absolute immunity in suits from money damages, but
no immunity in suits for injunctive relief. If the judge is
successfully sued for injunctive relief, the judge could be liable for
attorneys fees under Section 1983. The judges did not like this
very much and they tried very hard to lobby Congress for a statute
to amend Section 1983 to create absolute judicial immunity to suits
for injunctions as well. When the Republicans gained control of
Congress, finally the judges had a receptive audience. Indeed, two
years ago a statute was adopted, which is quoted within the
materials, 8 that now gives judges absolute immunity in suits for
both injunctive relief and for money damages. There is only a very
narrow exception if the judge violates prior to declaring judgment. 9
The final general principal to remember is that absolute immunity
is a judicial creation, not a legislative requirement. There is
nothing in Section 1983 that speaks of immunities at all. All
immunities whether they are absolute or qualified are a product of
judicial decisions?' In discussing prosecutorial immunity, the
'"

209 U.S. 123 (1908).

16 Clinton v. Jones, 117

S.Ct. 1636, 1643 (1997).

17466 U.S. 522 (1984).
18Federal Courts Improvement

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317 (b)-(c),

110 Stat. 3487.
'9

Id.

See e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (the Court held, "the
debates of the 42nd Congress do not support petitioners' contention that
Congress intended to provide a... damages remedy against police officers or
any other witnesses."). Id. at 341; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259
(1993) (determining that qualified, not absolute immunity existed when a
prosecutor makes statements to the press which are outside the context of
initiating a prosecution). Id. at 278; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991)
20
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crucial distinction is between prosecutorial and investigative. It is
important to recognize that since the Court has created this
distinction, the Court, not the legislature, gets to decide its
contours. Congress always has the ability to overrule the Court by
amending Section 1983 as it did for absolute immunity for judges to

injunctions, 2' but otherwise the Court is creating the immunities.?
When the Court creates absolute immunities, it says it is looking
both to history and function. The Supreme Court says Section 1983
was written against the backdrop of common law immunity.23 It
looks to the nature of the immunities as they existed in common law
when Section 1983 was adopted and if an official had absolute
immunity pre-Section 1983 then, that official has it now?2
I am skeptical about this historical analysis. For example consider
judicial immunity as articulated in Stump v. Sparkrman,2 in which
the Supreme Court held that judges have absolute immunity in suits
for money damages. The Supreme Court based this, in large-part,
on history. Professor Randy Block wrote an article in the Duke

Law Journal,2 in which he went to a survey of every state that
(holding that the state prosecutor's appearance at a probable cause hearing was
protected by absolute immunity). Id. at 492. The Court in Burns, however,
did not extend absolute immunity "to the prosecutorial function of giving legal
advice to the police." Id. at 496; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(holding prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under §1983 when
initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case.) Id. at 431; Kalina v.
Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997) (affirming its prior holdings that have
recognized that "the prosecutor is fully protected by absolute immunity when
performing the traditional functions of advocate."). Id. at 510; Stump v.
Sparkman, 43 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding that judge's erroneous approval of a
petition for sterilization still rendered him absolutely immune from damages).
Id. at 364.
2 See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
22 See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
' Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 331. "The immunity of parties and witnesses form
subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was
well established in English common law." Id.
2
AId. at 334.
25 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
26Id. at 364.
2 I. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial
Immunity, 1980 DUKEL. J. 879, 899 (November 1980).
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existed in 1871, and which ones did and did not have absolute
immunity for judges. He found only 13 of 37 states had absolute
judicial immunity in 1871, yet the Supreme Court cites to those 13,
ignoring the fact that the majority of states rejected absolute
immunity.
I think the functional analysis is more important to the Court. The
Court says that for those officers who are likely to be subjected to
repeated suits, there is a need for protection. For those officers
where the suits are likely to chill the excess of discretion, there is a
necessity for protection, and that is why the Court has said the
President has absolute immunity in carrying out the tasks of the
office. The Supreme Court said police officers testifying as
witnesses have absolute immunity. In Brisco v. Lahue," the Court
enumerated the same factors which lead it to that conclusion. The
same factors support its conclusion with regard to prosecutors.
The reason I am emphasizing this is that there are likely to be
many other officers who want to claim prosecutorial immunity. I
mentioned social workers; I think the arguments there, in part, will
be about history, but even more, they are about function. Is this a
kind of function that warrants absolute immunity; is it a
prosecutorial task or an investigative task, or an administrative one?
With those general principles in mind, I want to go to the second
of the three questions I said at the beginning, which is, when are
prosecutors entitled to absolute as opposed to qualified immunity?
The only way that I can answer this question is to tell you that there
have been four Supreme Court cases.
All four cases say
prosecutors have absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts, but only
qualified immunity for investigative and administrative ones, and if
you litigate in this area you simply need to rely on these four cases
for guidance.
Let me go through them one at a time. The first is Imbler v.
Pachtman. INber involved a prosecutor who knowingly used
perjured testimony. As a result of the perjured testimony, an
innocent individual was convicted and served nine years in prison.
Only after the true culprit was found did the individual learn that
2460

U.S. 325 (1983).

29424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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his conviction was obtained because of the use of perjured
testimony. A suit was brought against the prosecutor.
The United States Supreme Court for the first time articulated this
distinction between absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts and
qualified immunity for investigative or administrative acts. The
Supreme Court said using testimony at trial is quintessentially a
prosecutorial action so the prosecutor had absolute immunity to a
suit for money damages.? The Court said that there may be other
actions against the prosecutor, perhaps a criminal prosecution, 3' bar
disciplinary action, an administrative action within the office, but
no civil suit for money damages could be brought, even though an
innocent person spent nine years in prison? 2
The next time that the Supreme Court turned to this distinction
was in Bums v. Reed,3 a case of particularly colorful facts. It
starts with a tragedy. A woman awoke to discover that both of her
children had been shot; thankfully both recovered. The police
focused on the idea that the mother shot her own children. They
gave the mother a lie detector test and she passed. They gave the
mother a voice stress test and she passed. The police saw some
writing in lipstick on the mirror. Someone had written: "I have
taken from you what you love the most." Thereafter, the police
had the handwriting analyzed; it turned out that the writing in the
mirror was made by a lefthanded person and Kathy Bums, the
mother, was a righthanded person. She was completely exonerated
of any wrongdoing. Still, the police had no suspect. Then a police
officer developed a theory, maybe Kathy Bums had a multiple

30 Id. at 428 (holding that "only . . . ininitiating a prosecution and in
presenting the state's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil action for
damages under § 1983."). Id.
3 Id. at 429 (stating, "[this court has never suggested that the policy
considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials
also placed beyond the reach of the criminal law."). Id.
' Id. at 415. Imbler was released in 1970 after having been convicted in
1961 and sentenced to death. Id. at 412. In 1964, Imbler was successful in
having the death sentence overturned on other grounds not pertinent to this
case. Id at 414.
31500 U.S. 478 (1991).
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personality disorder and one of her alternative personalities was
responsible for the shootings.
At that time, according to the Seventh Circuit opinion, the police
officer had a friend, a grocery store clerk who had just completed a
course in hypnosis. The police officer called the prosecutor, Rick
Reed, and asked if he could have Kathy Bums hypnotized to see if
she had multiple personality disorder. The prosecutor approved the
hypnosis and Kathy Bums was hypnotized by this grocery store
clerk. Apparently at one point she referred to herself with another
name in the third person. Based solely on this, the prosecutor went
to court the next day for an arrest warrant. The prosecutor never
disclosed the hypnosis to the judge. Additionally, it was never
disclosed, for example, that Kathy Bums was told under hypnosis
to fully answer all questions put to her by the police. Kathy Bums
spent four months in custody, temporarily lost custody of her
children and lost her job. No evidence of any wrongdoing was ever
found against Kathy Bums and she was released.
Kathy Bums sued the police officers and the prosecutor. The
prosecutor claimed absolute immunity. This went to the United
States Supreme Court.' The Supreme Court said prosecutors have
absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts. Requesting an arrest
warrant is a prosecutorial act so there could be no liability, but the
Supreme Court said prosecutors have only qualified immunity for
investigative acts.35 The Supreme Court said authorizing hypnosis
was investigative in nature so for that purpose he had only qualified
immunity. 36
The third of these cases was Buckley v. Fitzsimnons.Y Buckley
involved a high profile murder case in a county outside of Chicago.
Shortly before the election for district attorney, the incumbent held
a press conference, and announced the arrest of the murderer in the
' Id at 491 (holding that "absolute immunity . . . serves the policy of
protecting the judicial process"). Id. at 492.
5 Id. at 493.
3 Id. at 496. The Court determined that the respondent had not met his
burden of showing that an extension of absolute immunity to the prosecutorial
function of giving legal advice to the police as to the use of hypnosis was
justified. Id.

37509 U.S. 259 (1993).
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case and claimed that the person placed under arrest had committed
these high profile crimes. After a long time in jail, it turned out
that there was no evidence to link the defendant to the crime. The
defendant was released and brought a civil suit against the
prosecutor.
There were two grounds for the civil suit against the prosecutor.
One concerned the press conference, the other concerned alleged
fabrication of evidence. There was a boot print at the murder
scene, and the prosecutor went to a number of experts to see if
those experts would link the defendant to the boot print. One
expert after another said there is no indication that this boot print
came from this defendant. Finally, the prosecutor found an expert
in North Carolina who said: not only can I match the shoe to the
defendant, but I can tell you that only the defendant could have left
this boot print. She said that she had a method where she could tell
by the distribution of weight who exactly left a footprint. She said
that each of us has a unique way of waing, and from looking at a
bootprint I can tell you that was this defendant. The prosecutor
found no one else who would say this, but this was the key
evidence that was used to keep the defendant in custody.
Subsequently, all charges were dismissed. Thereafter, a suit was
filed against the prosecutor, not only for the press conference, but
also for shopping for a new witness and fabricating evidence. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that prosecutors have only
qualified immunity for what they say at press conferences." The
Supreme Court said such conduct is not prosecutorial in nature, is
not even investigative, at most, it is administrative or publicrelations in nature. 9 Furthermore, the Court stated in a five to four
38

Id. at 277.

3 Id at 278. The Court stated:

The conduct of a press conference does not involve the
initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case
in court, or actions prepatory for these functions. Statements
to the press may be an integral part of the prosecutor's job
but . . . a prosecutor . . . is in no different position than
other executive officials who deal with the press, and . . .

qualified immunity is the form for them.
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decision, with regard to fabricating evidence, that it is only
protected by qualified immunity. When a prosecutor is alleged to
fabricate evidence, the prosecutor isl engaged in an investigative
task, not a prosecutorial task.4 Here the prosecutor went shopping
for an expert witness to say what the prosecutor wanted, and that is
the kind of investigative task usually performed by police officers,
not prosecutors, so for this, only qualified immunity. 1'
I find this part of the holding troubling in trying to come up with a
clear line between what is prosecutorial and what is investigative.
Why does a prosecutor go to get an expert witness; to use that
person at trial. Well, why then is shopping for the expert witness
to be regarded as investigative rather than prosecutorial in nature?
The fourth of the cases is Kalina v. Fletcher.4' Kalina involved a
prosecutor who sought an arrest warrant. In addition to going to
the court for the arrest warrant, the prosecutor submitted a
certificate, an affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, and it turns
out the arrest warrant had some false information. The defendant
was accused of having stolen computers from the school, and one
of the allegations was that the defendant had never otherwise been
in the school. The reason this was important is that the defendant's
fingerprint was found on a partition in the school, so if the
fingerprint was there and the defendant had never been there, that is
highly implicative. However, it turned out the defendant had
properly been in the school. He had been there to install partitions,
so the prosecutors' lie here was quite important. Additionally, the
certificate said that a clerk or salesperson in a computer store could
identify the defendant as somebody coming in to price computers.
This was important because the defendant was accused of stealing
computers from the school, and if the defendant brought a computer
into the computer store to ask what it was worth, it would be
indicative of guilt. It turns out this allegation was also false.

0 Id. at 276 (holding "[a] prosecutor may not shield his investigative work in
the aegis of absolute immunity."). Id.
41Id. "When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same ...
the immunity that protects them is also the same." Id.
42 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
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The Supreme Court once more reaffirmed the distinction between
absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts, and qualified immunity
for investigative acts. The Supreme Court says seeking an arrest
warrant is prosecutorial, that is protected by absolute immunity, but
filling out and submitting the certificate or affidavit, that is
investigative in nature, and therefore, that it is protected by only
qualified immunity., To me, this makes the distinction between.
absolute and qualified immunity for prosecutors ever more difficult.
Why is seeking the arrest warrant protected by absolute immunity,
but submitting the affidavit in support of that very same arrest
warrant supported only by qualified immunity? It is this difficulty,
distinguishing between prosecutorial and investigative tasks that
takes me to the third and final question that I want to address, and
that is, from a practical perspective, how do courts distinguish what
is prosecutorial and what is investigative?
Hopefully, it is obvious from the cases I have reviewed that there
is no litmus test. There is no easy rule that I can articulate for you
as to what is prosecutorial or what is investigative, but I would
suggest to you that three factors seem to explain what the Supreme
Court and the lower courts have done. First, is the action by the
prosecutor in"
court or out of court? If the action is in court, it is
presumptively prosecutorial; if the action is out of the court, it is
presumptively nonprosecutorial. Although it is not an absolute
rule, it explains a lot. In Imbler v. Pachtman," the prosecutor's
testimony was in court. In Burns v. Reed,4" going for the arrest
warrant was in court, but authorized hypnosis was out of court. In,
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons," all the actions, the press conference and
43Id. at 510.

No matter how brief or succinct it may be, the evidentiary
component of an application for an arrest warrant is a distinct
and essential predicate for a finding of probable cause. Even
then the person who makes the constitutionally required
'Oath or Affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she
persons in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.
Id.
44424 U.S. 409 (1976).
4550o U.S. 478 (1991). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
46 509 U.S. 259 (1993). See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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shopping for experts, was out of the court.

Kalina v. Fletcher'

does not entirely fit because submitting the arrest warrant was in
court, but so was the affidavit.

I consider three lower court cases with regard to prosecutorial
immunity that also fit within this question. The first is Doe v.
Philips,"' the Second Circuit case.

The prosecutor said to the

defendant, "If you will swear on a bible that you didn't commit the
offense, I will dismiss all of the charges against you." 9 The court
said asking somebody to swear on a bible outside of court is not a

prosecutorial act, prosecutors are not supposed to be administering
oaths, prosecutors are not supposed to be determining whether to

bring charges on this basis.

°

So the court rejected both absolute

and qualified immunity. I think what is key is that it happened out
of the court.' Compare it to a couple of others cases I have listed.

Estevers v. Brook 2 is a civil suit against the prosecutors for using
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion in violation of
Batson v. Kentucky. 3 Prosecutors have absolute immunity for the

way they use peremptory challenges at trial. That of course is in
court, which helps explain why it is protected by absolute
immunity.
When I teach this material, I often raise the question for my
students, should a prosecutor's conduct of grand jury proceedings

be regarded as prosecutorial or investigative? Often a grand jury is
purely investigative. Think of the Whitewater grand jury Kenneth
Starr presided over, that seems entirely an investigative grand jury.
U.S. 118 (1997). See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
F.3d 1204, 1211 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming no absolute immunity for
the prosecutor's conduct "because his demand that Doe swear her innocence
on a bible in church was manifestly beyond his authority.").
41Id. at 1207.
'old. at 1210-11.
51 Id. at 1211 (stating "[t]he proceeding took place in a church.").
52 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that because the [prosecutor's]
"use of peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner was part of her
presentation of the state's case, she is entitled to absolute immunity from
personal liability.").
" 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (stating the Equal Protection Clause "forbids the
States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a
particular case simply because the defendant is black.").
47522
4' 81
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Other times, when the product is an indictment, then it is
prosecutorial. Should the distinction be drawn based on the
prosecutors goal with regard to the grand jury? Smith v. Gribertz'
is a very broad opinion saying that grand juries should be
prosecutorial in nature, and when prosecutors are conducting grand
jury proceedings they ate safeguarded by absolute immunity."
That is one of the factors I think courts look to.
A second factor is, who usually performs the task. If it is a task
that is usually performed by the prosecutor, then I think there is a
presumption that it is prosecutorial, but if it is a task usually
performed by other government officials, then the presumption is
that it is nonprosecutorial. I think this explains Kalina v. Fletcler.
Usually, it is not prosecutors who submit affidavits or certificates in
support of arrest warrants. Usually, police fill out the affidavits.
What the Supreme Court was saying in Kalina, is when the
prosecutor takes over the task generally performed by the police,
the prosecutor gets only qualified immunity. In contrast, if it is a
task usually performed by the prosecutor, then that explains the
situations where the prosecutor gets absolute immunity.
And the third question I think courts often look to is how
discretionary is the act for the prosecutor? How much is it a matter
of choice for the prosecutor to do it? The less discretion the
prosecutor has, the more it is ministerial, the greater presumption is
protected by absolute immunity, but the more discretion the
prosecutor has, I think the more there is a presumption it is
qualified immunity. I think this explains some of the cases. In the
context of Burns v. Reed,' the prosecutor received qualified
immunity on the issue of whether or not to authorize hypnosis. In
the context of Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,1 holding a press conference
' 887 F. Supp. 583, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court was unwilling to issue
a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent
injunction "in a pending state court proceeding on the basis of plaintiff's
conclusionary contention [that the District Attorney is acting without hope of a
valid
conviction]. Id. at 589.
5
5

id.

522 U.S. 118 (1997). See supranotes 41-42 and accompanying text.
U.S. 478 (1991). See supranotes 32-35 and accompanying text.
' 509 U.S. 259 (1993). See supranotes 36-40 and accompanying text.

5
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was purely discretionary. In Ftzsimmons," shopping for the expert
witness was discretionary, so I think courts are influenced by how
much the choice by the prosecutor was voluntary. Whenever you
have multiple factors like this, the courts have a tremendous amount
of discretion, and there is inherently going to be this gray area
between what is prosecutorial and what is investigative, but this is
the most guidance that the Court has given.

59 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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